GEOPOLITICAL INTRIGUES

POLITICAL MANEUVERS BEFORE THE ASSASSINATIONS

Political Nature in Rwanda of 1990s

Following the failed coup attempt in 1985, masterminded by Colonel Kanyarengwe and Major Lizinde Theoneste, the previously underground opposition against Habyarimana’s regime gained momentum, despite the absence of an open political space for their grievances. Politicians primarily from Rwanda’s southern region (Nduga) began distributing political tracts in Kigali, urging people to protest against the Habyarimana regime (Sellström, Wohlgemuth & Dupont, 1996; Reyntjens, 2004). Throughout the late 1980s, the Anti Abakiga (northerners) sentiments and movements emerged, primarily comprising southern intellectuals, businessmen, and journalists associated with the Nduga group. This movement was a response to the grievances of those perceived as southerners, known as “Abanyenduga,” stemming from the unaddressed issues resulting from the 1973 coup d’état led by Habyarimana and predominantly northern senior military officers, which had overthrown the republic’s founding father, Kayibanda Gregoire. By October 1, 1990, when Tutsi rebels invaded Rwanda from Uganda, the southern opposition had created a conducive political environment that openly supported the Tutsi invasion, primarily perceiving it as anti-Habyarimana (Sellström, Wohlgemuth & Dupont, 1996; Reyntjens, 2004).

In 1991, Western imperialism was actively reshaping the African political landscape, pushing for the implementation of African multipartism, a concept that, while ostensibly advocating for democratic institutions, was often perceived as a strategy to further divide African nations in order to maintain Western interventionism under the banner of the “second wave of liberation in Africa” (National Research Council, 1992; Crawford, 1994; Adesida & Oteh, 2004). This era witnessed a challenge to authoritarian regimes across the continent, often with the backing of Western powers, leading to the emergence of opposition political groups in Rwanda and other African countries that openly called for political pluralism as an alternative to the one-party regimes established in the 1970s (Sahr, 1992). Unfortunately, in Rwanda, this period of political change coincided with the country’s war with Uganda, which was supporting Tutsi rebels in their invasion of Rwanda. Despite the ongoing conflict, political opportunists seeking power aligned themselves with the Tutsi rebels of the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) to weaken Habyarimana’s government, which they perceived as representing the interests of the “Abakiga.” These groups received financial and political support from Western imperialism agents from the UK, USA, Belgium, and Canada, aiming to promote the multipartism agenda. This alignment not only undermined Habyarimana’s regime but also exacerbated divisions among Rwandans, extending beyond ethnic lines to regionalism, particularly between the Nduga (South) and Kiga (North) regions (Onana, C., & Mushayidi, D., 2002).

The “ Rukokoma” Factor

Among the notable Hutu politicians from the southern region who passionately advocated for the ousting of Habyarimana’s regime were two brothers-in-law driven by a desire to avenge their father-in-law, President Gregoire Kayibanda. These influential southern politicians included Twagiramungu Faustin, who later earned the moniker “Rukokoma,” and Emmanuel Gapyisi, both members of the MDR (The Republican Democratic Movement, or Mouvement démocratique républicain in French). The term “Rukokoma” originally emerged as a political slogan, signifying “Conférence Nationale Souveraine” or Sovereign National Conference in Kinyarwanda, and was coined by Rwandan opposition leader Twagiramungu Faustin in the 1990s, as a call for a general conference of all Rwandans to exert pressure on Habyarimana to accept multipartism in Rwanda (Bucyalimwe Mararo, 2014; Onana, 2017). However, as people began to realize that Twagiramungu, or “Rukokoma,” was aligning himself with a group responsible for atrocities in regions like Ruhengeri and Byumba and that he seemed blinded by his political ambitions, openly praising Tutsi rebel attacks on innocent civilians, the term “Rukokoma” gradually transformed into a symbol of those politicians who sought to destabilize Rwanda politically, becoming a rallying cry for those more interested in regime change than in preserving Rwanda’s sovereignty (Bucyalimwe Mararo, 2014; Onana, 2017).

On Thursday, June 24, 1993, Rwandans came to realize that Twagiramungu was prioritizing his political interests over the well-being of the country, leading to his dismissal by the MDR national congress. He faced accusations of colluding with Tutsi rebels to undermine Rwanda, primarily driven by his animosity towards Habyarimana’s regime. Twagiramungu had also surrounded himself with individuals sympathetic to the RPF, causing concern within the MDR leadership and contributing to destabilization in Rwanda. Moreover, he had entered into a political rivalry with his brother-in-law, Emmanuel Gapyisi, further fueling tensions among MDR politicians and leadership. At one point, Twagiramungu organized the “Rukokoma” protests, which paralyzed the nation, particularly Kigali, the capital, resulting in what he termed “La Ville Morte” or the dead city. These protests were criticized for facilitating the infiltration of RPF death squad elements into Kigali, later accused of targeting those who didn’t support the RPF’s political agenda or endorse Twagiramungu Faustin and his associate Madam Uwiringiyimana Agathe (Bucyalimwe Mararo, 2014; Onana, 2017). By 1993, Twagiramungu had abandoned his original ideals of promoting multipartism in Rwanda, shifting his focus towards avenging his father-in-law and fully supporting the RPF, with suspicions of contemplating ascending to power through the assassination of Habyarimana.

Targeted Assassinations

In 1992, during the prolonged conflict between Tutsi rebels and the Habyarimana government, a notable shift in the RPF’s strategy emerged. They transitioned from relying solely on military operations to a campaign of targeted assassinations, aiming at prominent southern Rwandan elites, including Habyarimana himself, and specific northern Hutu elites, especially within the military. This approach sought not only to eliminate key figures but also to instill fear within the general population. As terror spread throughout Rwanda, including the capital, the RPF strategically framed a narrative suggesting that Habyarimana’s regime could no longer guarantee the safety of Rwandans. Concurrently, Western-backed policies advocating for multiparty systems in African nations inadvertently weakened the Habyarimana government and strengthened the Tutsi rebels’ position (Lemarchand, 1994; Minister, Revolution & from Belgium, 1994; Clapham, 1998; Burnet, 2008; Capital & Capital, 2019). Additionally, some youth aligned with opposition political parties, largely supported by southerners, joined the RPF’s campaigns, engaging in mayhem, targeted assassinations, and organizing large demonstrations known as “Rukokoma,” which paralyzed Kigali and contributed to the RPF’s political influence within Rwanda, often overshadowing patriotism. Collectively, these factors undermined national security and the stability of the Habyarimana regime.

In 1993, Rwanda witnessed a series of assassinations targeting politicians who opposed the RPF’s ideology or the plans to assassinate President Habyarimana, fearing that his murder would plunge the nation into chaos and endanger the lives of the 800,000 Tutsis residing in Rwanda. Among these politicians, Twagiramungu Faustin, leader of the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR), stood out. He believed that Habyarimana’s removal was essential for the RPF, led by Kagame, to achieve military victory and for the MDR to seize power. However, not all MDR members shared this view, including Emmanuel Gapyisi, Twagiramungu’s brother-in-law, who had a different perspective. Some politicians within the MDR and beyond opposed such drastic measures in the name of politics, emphasizing the risk of catastrophe. In pursuit of peace and the well-being of Rwanda, Emmanuel Gapyisi and like-minded politicians established the “Rwandan Forum for Peace and Democracy (FPD),” with Gapyisi serving as its president. The FPD aimed to unite political parties in Rwanda that advocated for peace, democracy, and opposed the RPF’s agenda of continuing the war until it assumed power.

Following the establishment of the “Rwandan Forum for Peace and Democracy (FPD),” many politicians aligned with the MDR faced opposition and threats from the pro-RPF faction within the MDR, led by Twagiramungu Faustin. The pro-RPF newspaper “ISIBO” openly criticized Emmanuel Gapyisi for founding the FPD, accusing him of being close to President Habyarimana Juvenal. In 1995, a series of political meetings took place at the Meridien Hotel in Kigali, during which members of the RPF battalion stationed in Kigali accused Gapyisi of obstructing their political agenda by promoting peace through the FPD. On May 18, 1993, the RPF newspaper “La Nation” published a cartoon depicting prominent politician Emmanuel Gapyisi kneeling before the RPF chairman with raised hands, as if seeking forgiveness. Gapyisi also received numerous threatening letters, urging him to cease his efforts in forming and promoting the Rwanda Forum for Peace and Democracy, as it challenged their political objectives (Des Forges, 1999). Despite these challenges, individuals like Emmanuel Gapyisi and Stanislan Mbonampeka, who had resigned from The Liberal Party (Parti Libéral, PL), persisted in their political endeavors, advocating for peace and an end to conflicts in Rwanda.

The Assassination of Emmanuel Gapyisi

By March 1993, politicians aligned with the RPF and the opposition, who supported Twagiramungu Faustin’s pro-RPF stance, began to realize they were losing ground in Rwanda’s political landscape. Emmanuel Gapyisi, with his FPD forum, was emerging as a strong candidate for the MDR in the upcoming presidential elections, while figures like Stanislas Mbonampeka signaled a shift in political alignments. Gapyisi’s appeal reached beyond the opposition to include independent voters seeking a middle ground between Habyarimana and Twagiramungu Faustin’s camp. This transformation posed a threat not only to Twagiramungu and his supporters but also to the RPF, which relied on a robust internal opposition to Habyarimana. Moreover, the resignation of Stanislas Mbonampeka, a member of the pro-RPF PL party, had a significant impact within the pro-RPF camp as he was among the few Hutus supporting such a party in Rwanda. His departure left the PL with a predominantly Tutsi membership, altering its national appeal. In May 1993, individuals believed to be part of an RPF assassination squad operating within Rwanda attacked Mbonampeka’s home, using a handheld grenade that shattered his house windows but narrowly missed him (Des Forges, 1999).

Additionally, those with inside knowledge suggest that in May 1993, RPF agents in Kigali, along with members of Twagiramungu Faustin’s camp and Emmanuel Gapyisi, held a meeting in an attempt to persuade him to abandon the idea of creating a new political platform that aimed to unite politicians from various backgrounds. However, Gapyisi steadfastly refused to change his stance. Some also believe that Gapyisi’s departure from Twagiramungu’s MDR party was influenced by a critical disagreement that occurred between both Twagiramungu and Gapyisi, along with members of the RPF, in the presence of the then Prime Minister Agathe Uwiringiyimana. This disagreement revolved around proposed plans to assassinate Habyarimana using an airborne attack, as previous attempts on his life on the ground had failed. Gapyisi vehemently opposed such plans, causing concern among those present that he might disclose the secret plot to Habyarimana if he wasn’t eliminated.

On Tuesday, May 18, 1993, Emmanuel Gapyisi tragically lost his life in front of his Kigali residence when assailants on motorcycles, suspected to be members of the RPF commando squad operating in Kigali, opened fire. Gapyisi, sharing family ties with Grégoire Kayinbanda, Rwanda’s first president, and Faustin Twagiramungu as his brother-in-law, became a victim in a larger political maneuver. His assassination appeared designed to stoke tensions between MDR supporters, primarily concentrated in southern Rwanda, and MRND supporters, with the potential to ignite chaos. This chaos was seen as an opportunity for the over 600 RPF military battalion members stationed in Kigali to launch attacks, thus disrupting the ongoing Arusha Peace Accord negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. From the outset, the RPF had reservations about the accord, as they enjoyed support from the U.S. government under President Bill Clinton, which had promised them a path to power, rather than accepting the power-sharing framework laid out in the Arusha Peace Accords. In the 1990s, Emmanuel Gapyisi studied in Nairobi, where he engaged with individuals opposed to the Habyarimana regime and was introduced to RPF members and their plans to invade Rwanda. After completing his studies, he returned to Rwanda, worked in the Ministry of Transport, and became one of the earliest members of the MDR when new political parties began to emerge (The International Criminal Tribunal , October 1, 2004).

Following the assassination of Emmanuel Gapyisi, the RPF continued its campaigns to instill fear among Rwandans, especially in Kigali. Many prominent individuals, including those involved in business and local politics, were targeted for assassination. Among the victims during that period were Madam Scholastique Mukarurinda, shot at her home in Kiyovu, and politician Kalisa Calixte. Others were arrested while planning to assassinate Rwandan politicians, with one such individual, Usengamungu, confessing to being sent by the RPF. Usengamungu also disclosed his prior service as a kit squad member in Uganda, where he trained at Basiima Bakyagaya House, previously the residence of Sir Apollo Kagwa during the reign of Kabaka Daudi Chwa. In the 1980s, this house served as Museveni’s torture headquarters, led by Paul Kagame, and the skills acquired there played a role in spreading terror in Rwanda (Kintu, 2005). Senior Officer (SO) Karenzi Karake and Captain Charles Ngomanziza are prominent figures frequently referenced in reports documenting atrocities against Hutus by the RPF, as well as in the assassinations of Hutu politicians and opinion leaders, whether they were in opposition or supporting President Habyarimana. Some of the politicians targeted by these two RPF soldiers included Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatabazi, Martin Bucyana, and Rwambuka, among others. Both General Karake Karenzi and Captain Charles Ngomanziza have been repeatedly cited by human rights organizations and the international media for their alleged involvement in planning and carrying out operations related to the assassinations of Emmanuel Gapyisi and Felicien Gatabazi, as well as other Hutu politicians in various regions including Kigali, Byumba, and Ruhengeri (Kintu, 2005).

Additionally, another key figure implicated in organizing kidnappings and assassinations in Kigali during the period between 1992 and 1993 is Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kayonga, then Senior Officer SORPA, who also served as the Commanding Officer of Battalion No. 3 and was a member of the RPF Network Commando. Karenzi Karake and Charles Kayonga were not only actively involved in the planning but also in the eventual assassination of Felicien Gatabazi, the Founder and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Minister of Public Works, who was ambushed and killed while driving from a political meeting to his residence in the capital, Kigali. Furthermore, they were involved in inciting Hutu youth from southern Rwanda on Tuesday, February 22, 1994, to target and brutally murder another Hutu politician, Martin Bucyana. This Hutu youth, who had been infiltrated by the RPF Tutsi Network Commando squad, dragged Bucyana out of his car and used machetes to perpetrate his brutal killing (Hilsum, 1994).

The Assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye

As the assassinations unfolded in Rwanda, orchestrated by Tutsi rebels with the support of accomplices within Rwanda, mainly members of opposition parties opposed to Habyarimana’s regime, our brethren in Burundi were striving to embrace democracy. Burundi’s Hutus had endured centuries of oppression, unlike in Rwanda, where a revolution led by our forefathers had ended the 400-year Tutsi monarchy. In Burundi, however, Hutus continued to face violence at the hands of Tutsi military regimes that had seized power in the 1960s, toppling the Tutsi monarchy. Some Burundian Hutus, who had sought refuge in Rwanda after the 1972 Hutu genocide in Burundi, had the opportunity to access education in Rwanda. Led by a Burundian banker turned politician, Melchior Ndadaye, they returned to Burundi to participate in the nation’s first-ever democratic elections on June 1, 1993 (Reyntjens, 1993; Ball, 2002; Bundervoet, 2009; Guillebaud, 2011).

By June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, the leader of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), had garnered support from three other major political parties, forming a formidable alliance that sent shivers through the Tutsi hegemony, not only in Burundi but also across the entire East African region. The Tutsis in Burundi were deeply apprehensive about relinquishing power, and this alliance posed a significant challenge to their long-held dominance. For Paul Kagame, such a political alliance signaled a potential shift in the trajectory of the RPF’s military and political activities in Burundi. On June 1, 1993, Ndadaye emerged triumphant, winning the elections with an impressive 65% of the vote, a result that various electoral observers confirmed to be both free and fair (Reyntjens, 1996; Reyntjens, 2006; Colombo, d’Aoust & Sterck,2019).

Subsequently, Ndadaye’s political party, FRODEBU, secured a decisive victory in legislative elections held on June 29, 1993, capturing 65 out of 81 seats in the National Assembly. This marked the end of Tutsi hegemony in Burundi and ushered in new hope for a Burundi free from ethnic discrimination. Melchior Ndadaye’s inauguration as the first Hutu president of Burundi, and the first democratically elected president in the country’s history on July 10, 1993, heralded a transformative era in Burundi’s political landscape. However, amidst the celebrations, General Paul Kagame was repeatedly spotted in Burundi, not with benevolent intentions, but rather to devise strategies to thwart the Burundian people’s aspirations for democracy. He was acutely aware that the Tutsi defeat in Burundi constituted a strategic setback for his military campaign and a political nightmare. His supporters in the West, including Belgium, shared these concerns, realizing that their plans to seize power in Rwanda to gain access to valuable minerals in Zaire/DR Congo, with the support of a Hutu-led government in Burundi, were becoming increasingly challenging to realize. General Kagame, with unwavering military and political backing from Burundi under Major Pierre Buyoya, had yet to achieve his goal of capturing power in Kigali. Consequently, the elimination of Ndadaye became a pressing objective, regardless of the cost (Lemarchand, 2006; Helbig de Balzac, Ingelaere & Vandeginste, 2011; Speight & Wittig, 2018).

In the early morning hours of Thursday, October 21, 1993, military units primarily comprised of senior Tutsi officers strategically positioned themselves around Bujumbura, including key access points like the international airport and roads leading to Rwanda and Tanzania. Launching a violent assault on the presidential palace, a prolonged firefight with the presidential guard ensued. Amid the chaos, Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi’s first Hutu president, was captured and transported to a military camp. There, he encountered General Kagame and Major Buyoya, marking the beginning of a harrowing ordeal that ended in his brutal murder.

The notorious Tutsi extremist, Colonel Bikomagu, with a history of involvement in coups in Burundi, played a pivotal role in capturing President Melchior Ndadaye. Bikomagu orchestrated Ndadaye’s transfer from his presidential office to another military camp in Bujumbura, where both General Kagame and Major Buyoya eagerly awaited his arrival. In the presence of his family members and children, Ndadaye endured prolonged and brutal torture, dispelling inaccurate reports suggesting he was shot. The grim reality was far more horrifying, as he suffered a gruesome fate with a noose around his neck and multiple stab wounds inflicted upon him, all while General Paul Kagame, Major Paul Buyoya, and Colonel Jean Bikomagu bore witness to this horrifying act. Tragically, President Ndadaye’s life slipped away as he bled to his untimely death, marking a dark and tragic chapter in history.

The U.N. report, initially suppressed at the behest of powerful nations when presented to the UN Security Council, raised concerns about the potential escalation of ethnic tensions in the region if the names implicating those involved were disclosed. Additionally, there was apprehension that releasing the report could compromise the broader geopolitical agendas these powerful nations held for the region. This tragic event, the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye in 1993, played a pivotal role in igniting widespread ethnic conflict in Burundi, plunging the nation into a period of profound turmoil and violence. Notably, General Kagame’s involvement was not the first instance of Rwandan Tutsi participation in the assassination of Burundian Hutu leaders. A similar tragic incident had occurred on January 15, 1965 when a Hutu Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe was assassinated by a Rwandan Tutsi individual employed by the U.S. Embassy in Burundi just three weeks into his tenure (Correspondent, 1965; ReliefWeb, 1996, August 23; Carney, 2015; Nagar, 2022).

The assassination of Melchior Ndadaye conveyed a resounding message to regional leaders, notably in Rwanda, about the unwavering determination of extremist Tutsis and their Western supporters to pursue a broader regional geopolitical agenda, aiming to control Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire/DR Congo. While Tanzania and South Africa were eager to support the Hutus in Burundi, offering military and political backing to establish democracy and alleviate the Burundian people’s suffering and refugee status, a different dynamic unfolded in Tanzania concerning Rwanda. Julius Nyerere’s deep-seated animosity towards Habyarimana, who had ousted Nyerere’s friend Gregoire Kayibanda and orchestrated his demise, continued to shape Nyerere’s decisions. He made a personal vow to witness Habyarimana’s downfall within his lifetime. Nyerere intensified his support for the RPF, bolstering Kagame and his Western supporters and lobbyists. Despite numerous failed attempts to assassinate Habyarimana within Rwanda, thwarted by his highly trained presidential guard (French: Garde Presidentielle), his adversaries concluded that luring him out of Rwanda would isolate him from his protective entourage and render him vulnerable to an aerial attack.

Six months following the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, Tanzania extended a critical offer to host peace talks aimed at resolving the ongoing crisis in Burundi. This crisis had been exacerbated by Ndadaye’s tragic death and the emergence of new Hutu rebel groups. This diplomatic endeavor had a twofold purpose: ostensibly, it aimed to achieve peace, but it also concealed geopolitical motives, strategically drawing African leaders targeted by Western powers to Tanzania. The peace negotiations were skillfully chaired by the esteemed Julius Nyerere, renowned for his regional influence, and his involvement was instrumental in encouraging the participation of key figures whom various entities sought to sway or eliminate. For Nyerere, it presented an opportunity to seek retribution for the death of President Kayibanda Gregoire, an unforgotten grievance. This diplomatic maneuvering culminated in the hasty arrangement of a peace summit scheduled for April 6, 1994, in Dar es Salaam, setting the stage for significant geopolitical developments in East Africa. Western superpowers were also keenly interested in shaping East African geopolitics, particularly in light of the Congolese rare minerals. Among those involved in these geopolitical dynamics were figures like the US Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell and her Assistant Secretary George Moose (Willard, 2018).

The meeting was strategically crafted to assemble regional leaders onto the Western imperialism radar, with a focus on achieving long-term geopolitical alignment in Africa’s Great Lakes region. Foremost among those targeted by this gathering was President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire/DR Congo, a once long-term CIA partner in the central African region who had played a pivotal role in destabilizing Angola and supporting the US-funded Angolan rebel, Colonel Jonas Malheiro Savimbi. However, Mobutu had fallen out of favor with the CIA. Additionally, President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, who had steadfastly resisted Western pressure and pursued policies free from Western debts, found himself on the Western radar. Habyarimana Juvenal of Rwanda, who had refused to yield the Bugesera region for US military activities and was an arch-enemy of Nyerere, was another key participant. Yoweri Museveni Kaguta of Uganda, the new darling of the West, also attended. Lastly, there was Ntaryamira Cyprian of Burundi, a novice politician thrust into the intricate politics of the Great Lakes region by fate. Regional political analysts viewed the Dar es Salaam summit with suspicion, as it brought together leaders who were at odds with Western imperialism’s interests (Weissman, 1979; Morrison, 1988; Nesbitt, 1992; Windrich, 2000).

Sustained Political Pressure

It is widely believed that individuals with profound insight and close connections to President Habyarimana Juvenal, including his family, were deeply uneasy about the hurriedly arranged and ambiguously defined meeting of such great significance. While the primary focus of this assembly was to address the implementation of the Burundi peace accord, the inclusion of an agenda regarding Rwanda and the RPF raised suspicions. Habyarimana’s advisors strongly discouraged his attendance. Notably, just a few weeks before the summit, Habyarimana had not yet confirmed his participation. Julius Nyerere’s persistence led him to approach the then Tanzanian president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, affectionately known to Tanzanians as ‘Mzee Rukhsa.’ President Mwinyi was requested to direct the Tanzanian ambassador to Rwanda, Saleh Boi Tambwe, to locate President Habyarimana and persuade him to attend. Habyarimana’s presence was deemed critical as discussions encompassed the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord and the establishment of a broad government. On March 11, 1994, Ambassador Saleh Boi Tambwe embarked on a mission to find Habyarimana. Initially, he visited Village Urugwiro, but Habyarimana had already left Kigali for his rural home in his native village, Gasiza. Ambassador Saleh Boi Tambwe had to undertake a journey to Rambura to locate Habyarimana and facilitate his conversation with President Nyerere over the phone (Willard, 2018; Mwinyi & Sympho, 2020).

In the days leading up to Kagame’s journey to Burundi, where the plot to assassinate the newly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, would unfold, Kagame and an RPF delegation embarked on a significant trip to Kampala on October 4, 1993. There, they met with U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, Johnnie Carson, engaging in discussions that included inquiries about the possibility of the U.S. contributing troops in Kigali. This request revealed their aspiration for not only political and financial support from the U.S. but also a military presence. Fast forward to March 24, 1994, just before the tragic assassinations of Habyarimana Juvenal and his Burundian counterpart, a pivotal meeting took place in Kigali. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell, held a resolute one-hour discussion with Habyarimana Juvenal. During this meeting, she applied substantial pressure on Habyarimana, insisting on his acceptance of the terms of the Arusha peace accord, which was perceived as favoring the Tutsi minority with over 40% of power, including military unification, despite their constituting only 14% of Rwanda’s population. Bushnell also made it unequivocally clear that Habyarimana’s attendance at the forthcoming Dar es Salaam meeting was non-negotiable. She issued a stark warning that the U.S. government, under Bill Clinton’s administration, would terminate all financial support to Rwanda, including funding for HIV prevention and treatment, should he fail to comply. Subsequently, after this intense encounter, Bushnell journeyed into Burundi, where she met with the newly inaugurated Burundian President, Cyprien Ntaryamira. Employing a similar assertive approach, she emphasized the critical nature of his attendance at the Dar es Salaam meeting as an imperative condition for continued U.S. support to Burundi (William, 2004).

Habyarimana’s Last Easter

On Sunday, April 3, 1994, nestled in Rambura, his rural home, President Habyarimana, a devout Catholic, marked his final Easter with his family. This retreat provided a respite from the mounting international and geopolitical pressures, driven by the ambitions of the USA, UK, and Tanzania to establish a new geopolitical coalition for access to the mineral-rich Congo. Despite persistent warnings and reminders from his family about the deep-seated enmity harbored against him by Tanzania’s Nyerere, Habyarimana remained steadfast in his decision to attend the Dar es Salaam meeting. His conviction lay in the belief that his sacrifice could potentially alleviate the enduring ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis, making it a worthy sacrifice for the nation. Prior to cementing this resolve, he turned to his longtime friend, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, engaging in extensive discussions about the implications of the Dar es Salaam summit and the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Great Lakes region. During a phone call from Mobutu’s rural home in Gbadolite, they also reached out to the Kenyan president, another close associate of Habyarimana. Collectively, these leaders agreed that the hastily convened meeting lacked substantive agenda. Moreover, Mobutu and Moi shared intelligence reports that strongly advised against attending, citing a plot to assassinate the three presidents: Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Habyarimana Juvenal of Rwanda, and Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi. Mobutu alluded to a trusted source within his intelligence circle, possibly he was talking about François de Grossouvre, a senior official at Paris’s Élysée Palace (N’gbanda, 1998).

In defiance of the Kinyarwanda saying, “Amatwi arimo urupfu ntiyumva,” which translates to “The ears of one destined to die don’t heed warnings,” Habyarimana remained resolute in his decision to embark on his journey to Dar es Salaam. Despite the myriad warnings and counsel he received, first from his own family, followed by his friends, and even political allies such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Daniel Arap Moi, he chose to ignore them. He briefly stopped in Kigali to pick up Saleh Boi Tambwe, the long-time Tanzanian Ambassador to Rwanda and his close friend, before proceeding to Dar es Salaam. However, insiders later revealed that the meeting carried an unusual atmosphere, lacking a clear agenda and resembling more of an informal gathering than a significant regional conference. Reports also suggested that President Yoweri Museveni was engaged in lengthy phone calls, potentially as a means to delay the meeting. Speculation arose that this gathering might have been an intricately set trap orchestrated by Western superpowers with geopolitical ambitions for the region. Attendees recounted a palpable sense of disappointment and frustration when it became apparent that among the three presidents who were potentially targeted for assassination that evening, only Habyarimana had attended the meeting, while Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko and Daniel Arap Moi were notably absent.

Fattening to Kill

Upon reaching Dar Es Salaam for the anticipated Burundi peace summit, President Habyarimana and his team were taken aback by the absence of a structured agenda. Rather than meaningful discussions, the emphasis seemed to be on refreshments and the conspicuous absence of the Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko and the Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi, whose people had also nicknamed as the professor of politics. The frequent phone engagements of Presidents Museveni of Uganda and Nyerere of Tanzania raised eyebrows. They used the absence of President Moi and Mobutu as a way to cover up their intentions and made several calls which were said to be directed to both Moi and Habyarimana; however, later it came to be known that neither Nyerere nor Museveni were calling Moi or Mobutu. Some attendees speculated they were liaising with Paul Kagame and his forces in Kigali, potentially conspiring against Habyarimana. The lack of a solid agenda and the incessant interruptions hinted at a deliberate stalling tactic.

Suspicions arose that Museveni and Nyerere were intentionally delaying Habyarimana’s departure, perhaps giving the RPF time to finalize an assassination plot. As evening approached, Habyarimana sought to stay overnight in Tanzania, but Nyerere declined, citing a full presidential palace. Feeling the tension, Habyarimana decided to return to Kigali, leaving the then Tanzanian ambassador to Rwanda, Ambassador Saleh Boi Tambwe, whom he had offered a lift from Kigali earlier. Instead, Habyarimana offered a lift to the then-new Burundian president, Ntaryamira Cyprian, and several Burundian officials. Onboard the departing plane from Dar Es Salaam were carrying a total of twelve notable figures, including Juvénal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda; Cyprien Ntaryamira, President of Burundi; Bernard Ciza, Burundian Minister of Public Works; Cyriaque Simbizi, Burundian Minister of Communication; Major General Déogratias Nsabimana, Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army; Major Thaddée Bagaragaza, responsible for the “maison militaire” of the Rwandan president; Colonel Elie Sagatwa, Member of the special secretariat of the Rwandan president; Juvénal Renzaho, foreign affairs advisor to the Rwandan president; Dr. Emmanuel Akingeneye, personal physician to the Rwandan president; and the French aircraft crew, which included Jacky Héraud (pilot), Jean-Pierre Minaberry (co-pilot), and Jean-Michel Perrine (flight engineer).

Dr. William A. Twayigize

DR. WILLIAM